By: D. Gage Jordan
“Neurons wire together if they fire together.” - Siegrid Löwel (1992)
One important aspect of psychology to note is that there is never a “psychological process” without a corresponding biological one. In psychological research, we are faced with an abundance of psychological phenomena that we attempt to investigate, often not considering the underlying, biological processes. However, one aspect that has received considerable research involves what makes you, you: yourself. That is, the Self. We all have a concept of who we are as individuals, as well as the roles we play in society. But who are we, really? For a brief history, Swann and Buhrmester (2012) breaks down what historically has made us, us. The Self has been long been a philosophical point of contention, as evidenced by William James’ work in the late 19th century. Broadly, he determined that there is a “Me” and an “I” (forgive the impending tautology, psychology has made great strides since then). Broadly, James thought of “the Me” as representing one’s view of themselves, incorporating information via: (1) feedback from others; (2) one’s observation about one’s own behavior; and (3) inferences of one’s position in society. But, we can’t necessary take the “Me” from inside of us and study it, prompting a delineation of the “Me:” perhaps as semantic memories of oneself (e.g., such as one’s own address and what personality traits one has). Now, the “I,” on the other hand, is something more of a homunculus—it oversees what one is aware of and what one perceives (making the concept even less study-able). Nevertheless, James has provided us with a springboard to study how we view ourselves; and fortunately we (as psychology researchers) have come a long way in delineating these aspects. From a cognitive point of view, we can turn to Kihlstrom (2012), who proposes that the self can be construed as one’s mental representation of oneself. A seminal study by Rogers et al. (1977) discovered that when one processes items in a self-referential manner (e.g., associating objects with one self), memory tended to be enhanced for such items, leading the authors to conclude that the self is quite elaborate, incorporating powerful encoding processes. As alluded to earlier, the self likely involves a substantial memory component (as one has a chronology of one’s own life). An important construct is the “autobiographical self,” which contains a record of one’s actions and experiences. Such “selves” tend to exist even in amnesic patients (Kihlstrom, 2012). Thus, what better way to the study the self (this elusive latent variable) than investigating corresponding brain regions of activation?
Northoff et al. (2006) conducted a meta-analysis on imaging studies of the self. Another important distinction is made here: the “proto-self” refers to the body (movements and so forth), whereas the self of interest is often the autobiographical self. Another “reflective self” is a context-dependent self. Overall, our selves are characterized by emotional subjectivity, which helps us to consider objects and their ascribed importance. One way to measure the self (corresponding with neuroimaging) is often perspective taking. For example, Northoff et al. (2006, p. 443) discusses paradigms often used in such studies—many involving “reflection about one’s own traits” versus “reflection about other’s traits.” After assessing the self in relation to the domains of verbal, spatial, emotional, and social processing, as well as viewing memory study, a region called the cortical midline structure (CMS) stand out. This region involves specific brains areas associated (obviously) with the regions noted above. However, it appears that these regions are involved in transforming simple sensory processes into more complex self-referential processing. That is, the way the self is represented in the brain involves processes integrating basic processes, relating them to who that person is in, and allow that person to reflect on these experiences (i.e., by forming a chronology of life events). Thus, it appears (neurobiological) that the self is indeed an emergent property, unable to be studied via one process.
But, everybody is an n of one, and if a way of studying the self involves autobiographical processes, then everyone’s experience is unique. Even basic cognitive processes, which many consider “universal” differ across cultures. For example, Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010) provided an account that between industrialized and small-scale societies (e.g., tribal communities), major differences in visual perception (e.g., seeing or not seeing illusions) and spatial cognition (e.g., English-speakers tend to represent the location of objects relative to the self). Turning back to neuroscience, Kitayama and Park (2010) detail the stark contrast in brain functioning between cultures. Often compared are Western (e.g., more independent selves) and Eastern (e.g., more interdependent selves). Thus, culture plays a key role in how our brains are shaped. For example, Kitayama and Park propose that given that explicit values are emphasized in a cultural group, our conventions, routines, and actions are used to attain the values of a particular culture. Given that these behavioral routines are routinely engaged in, different patterns of neural activity are likely to be induced (e.g., neurons that fire together, wire together). In sum, research supports an emphasis on culture within the neuroscientific study of the self, given that the brain is dominated by plasticity, as well as existing differences in how people process information relative to themselves.